The Hungarian revolution disturbed the process of d�tente developing after 1953 for a short period of time but never stopped it, nor did it have any particular effect on its later course. The tension caused by Western condemnation of the Soviet intervention appeared mainly
in the field of propaganda and at UN forums, but the willingness to negotiate remained the same on the part of the Great Powers. Thus from the spring of 1957 we could witness a more active dialogue again, and from the end of the year preparations were underway for another East-West summit meeting.
The Soviet intervention in Hungary above all shook the faith of those who had nurtured illusions about the Soviet Union, and mainly "left-minded" people who had considered the Soviet Union the possible model of a socialistic society. For these people the Hungarian revolution was a test to see whether it was possible to realize an alternative socialism which would combine the practice of a Western-type political democracy with the principles of common property and social equality. So the brutal crushing of the Hungarian revolution had a negative effect not only on Western European communist parties but also on the leftwing of socialist and social democratic parties. It also contributed to the fact that new left-wing and later Eurocommunist tendencies developing in the sixties drew boundaries between themselves and the existing Soviet model in an attempt to find another form of socialist structure.
The suppression of the Hungarian revolution received considerable emphasis in the UN. A second special general meeting to discuss the Hungarian issue was called on November 4, 1956 on American initiative. This and the general meeting's 11th session in November and December passed several resolutions which called on the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops and the K�d�r government to receive the LIN Secretary General and other LIN observers, but the Hungarian government's negative attitude made an onthe-spot assessment of the situation impossible. So the UN created a special committee in January 1957 to draw up a report on the chronology and character of the Hungarian events based on the accounts of those who had participated in the revolution and who had subsequently fled to the West, and on other available sources. The report was finished in June 1957. The document described the uprising as a spontaneous manifestation of elementary force expressing the Hungarian people's wish for freedom. The special general meeting of September passed the report with a great majority but the resolutions
related to Hungary could never be enforced so the Hungarian issue was placed on the agenda of the UN general meeting every year until 1962.
The American leadership also drew the conclusion of the Hungarian revolution's suppression. The Western press frequently accused the United States of encouraging Hungarians to revolt, and then abandoning them when they did. An American answer was ready by the middle of November 1956: American politics had always been concerned about the fate of "imprisoned nations" but had never encouraged them to start armed revolt against their dictators as this would have been suicidal. This explanation convinced only few people.
Basically this was the beginning of the policy of "easing" employed until the end of the eighties and which aimed at "softening" Eastern European structures. That is, the West put political pressure on the leadership of a given state in the form of economic aid, favours, loans, cultural and interstate relationships etc. to make them follow a more liberal internal policy and an external policy more independent of the Soviet Union.
The American leadership applied this new, pragmatic policy in the LIN when dealing with the Hungarian issue. First, at general meetings the United States severely and repeatedly condemned over a period of some years the Soviet intervention – without result. Then in 1960, secret negotiations started between the United States and the K�d�r government. As a result the Hungarian issue was struck from the agenda of the UN general meeting in December 1962, while in Hungary the majority of those imprisoned for their participation in the 1956 revolution were given a general amnesty in 1963.

